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More Information From the 29 March Raid on the JCR Meeting in Argentina

Slowly but surely more information obtained by Argentine authorities on the 29 March raid on a policy meeting of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) by Argentine authorities is becoming known. 3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(1) According to individuals captured at the meeting, a conference of the JCR organized by the Trotskyist Fourth International (FI) was scheduled to be held in Colombia before July 1976. The purpose of the meeting would be to discuss centralizing subversive actions throughout South America. An unidentified French leftist group and a Cuban delegation are to attend. Reportedly, the meeting will still be held despite the 29 March raid.

These same individuals further reported that the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and its political arm, the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), were seeking to rejoin the FI. The two groups split in mid-1973. Additionally, authorities were told that Mario Roberto Santucho, the commander of the ERP and Secretary General of the PRT, had lost considerable prestige from the rank and file as the result of the disastrous ERP attack on the Domingo Viejobueno Arsenal Battalion in Monte Chingolo, Buenos Aires Province, in late December 1975. 3.3(b)(1) (Comment: There is not enough information available as yet to determine whether or not the JCR has any plans to cooperate with the FI. It should be noted that, while the Peronists were in power, they conducted an extensive propaganda campaign which stressed that terrorism in Argentina was the work of outsiders, more specifically the Trotskyists. On the other hand, the ERP and the PRT have suffered setbacks and may feel that they need more outside support to carry out their goals. Further, the FI has evinced great interest in the events in Argentina and the rest of South America over the last two years.)

In a related development, Chilean leftists have been complaining about the disappearance and presumed arrest in Argentina of Edgardo Enriquez, a leader of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Enriquez was in Argentina because he had been ordered by the MIR Central Committee in Cuba to infiltrate back into Chile and assume leadership of the organization from Hernan Aguilo. Enriquez

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traveled to Tucuman, Argentina, from Cuba by way of Peru, and contacted ERP members in Tucuman who were to arrange to smuggle him into Chile. On 28 April, the MIR mailed a communique to the Chilean press which called for the immediate release of Enriquez so that he would not be deported back to Chile. (Comment: Thus far the Argentine government has made no public statement on the arrest of Enriquez, [redacted] Enriquez and three unidentified MIR members were detained by Argentine authorities in the 29 March raid.) [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTS

NR

Date: 29 April 1976

Place: Argentina, Buenos Aires

French Citizen Kidnapped

A Frenchwoman, the widow of an Argentine journalist, was kidnapped from her home by five men wearing civilian clothes but claiming to be security forces, according to a French press agency. The news item claimed that the kidnapping "bore the earmarks of right-wing terrorists."

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Date: 4 May 1976

Place: Argentina, Buenos Aires

Fiat Executive Assassinated

An Italian executive of the Fiat automobile company in Buenos Aires was assassinated by terrorists as he left his home this morning. Fiat officials, who believe left-wing guerrillas are responsible, said this is the fourth murder of a company executive since 1972. Terrorist attacks have continued in Argentina in spite of the recent change in government. 3.5(c)

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I. Terrorist Threats and Plans:

NR

Target:	Business Executives	The Montoneros reportedly plan to renew operations to kidnap executives of large and wealthy firms in order to obtain funds.
Place:	Argentina	
Date:	Unknown	

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** Indicates a new threat reported for the first time.

* Indicates a revision of a threat reported in previous issues.

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Argentine Terrorists Take Hostage to Force Release of Chilean Ally

In late April the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) kidnapped an Argentine air force commodore, believed to be Robert Moises Echegoyen, and has subsequently demanded the release from prison of one Enriquez--probably Edgardo Enriquez, a leader of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and member of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). Enriquez reportedly was arrested by Argentine authorities when they raided a JCR meeting on 29 March. The Argentine air force has told the ERP that unless Echegoyen is returned unharmed, action will be taken against five members of the ERP now in custody.

3.3(b)(1)

The incident marks the first time that an Argentine terrorist group has conducted a kidnap operation to free a terrorist from another country. Kidnapping to force the release of prisoners is rare but not unknown in Argentine terrorism. The Montoneros kidnapped and later murdered Honorary U.S. Consul John P. Egan in Cordoba in February 1975 to secure the release of prisoners, and the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL) kidnapped the Chief Justice of the Provincial Supreme Court of Buenos Aires to secure the release of Sergio Schneider, an imprisoned FAL leader. According to U.S. officials on the scene, the Argentine air force is maintaining maximum security over the whole affair in order to maximize the chance for the safe return of Echegoyen.

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I. Terrorist Threats and Plans:

[redacted]

Target: Business Executives

Place: Argentina

Date: Unknown

* In late April it was reported that the Montoneros planned to renew operations to kidnap executives of large and wealthy firms in order to obtain funds. On 8 May the U.S. embassy reported that Dow Chemical and Chrysler Corporation, as well as nine other U.S. companies, have received identical threatening form letters from the Montoneros. The embassy and local police take the threats seriously and have so advised the company representatives. [redacted] 3.5(c)

3.5(c) [redacted]

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Target: Business Executives

Place: Argentina

Date: Unknown

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Montoneros on the Defensive in Argentina?

In February 1976, Argentine authorities captured several Montonero documents which show that the organization is on the defensive and is attempting to reorganize to better resist the government. According to the documents, the Montoneros recognize that the Argentine security forces have dealt them severe blows, particularly in the cities of the interior provinces. The Montoneros further recognize that government control of the interior will be inevitable, so they plan to confront the government in Buenos Aires Province, where they feel their chances are best. Because they feel that their organization in Buenos Aires is weak and in no condition to successfully combat the armed forces, the Montoneros are planning to send a significant number of their members into hiding to thwart the efforts of security elements to locate them. To that end the Montonero "tactical command" has ordered that an intensive effort be carried out to obtain legitimate documentation for the members going underground.

Along with this defensive operation, the Montoneros plan to continue to engage in some offensive actions to confront the military and reinforce the image of the Montonero organization. Although plans for these actions were not specific, another document revealed that in March and April, the Montoneros planned to conduct attacks against the police forces and business leaders and in May planned a campaign of "militant operations" at a national level. (During March and April there were numerous attacks on police, and several business executives were murdered by terrorists.

3.3(b)(1)

Because of their failures against the government, the documents reveal, the Montonero national council has been forced to take a critical look at their organizational structure and tactics. In a self-criticism session, the council severely denounced Roberto Quieto for allowing himself to be taken alive and without a struggle and for revealing information about the Montoneros. In the opinion of the council, Quieto acted selfishly by presuming that his high position gave him the right to try to utilize his rank and knowledge about the Montoneros to negotiate with the enemy.

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The national council not only was critical of Quieto, but it was also highly critical of itself. The council felt that the Montoneros had become bureaucratized and demilitarized to such an extent that the members lacked sufficient military training to conduct complicated terrorist operations. Further, the council felt that the national leadership had become so isolated that it lacked knowledge of the different Montonero regions and thus failed to produce a consistent, broad policy encompassing the entire organization.

To take care of this situation, the council decided to stress greater democratization of the organization to allow for more effective communication between the leadership and the rank and file. To keep the military competence of the membership at a high level, the council decided to re-emphasize military training and to plan at least one operation a year involving large numbers of troops. Finally, to improve security, the council decided to appoint a security officer for each of the regions and to see to it that every Montonero has a weapon in good operating condition, to be used to resist capture or to commit suicide if capture seems imminent.

Although the Montoneros may not have the capability to conduct sustained terrorist campaigns at the present time, this does not mean that they are incapable of taking any action. If they succeed in their reorganization plans they could prove to be a threat to the military government for some time to come. Further, if the military counterterrorist effort continues to be successful, the Montonero leadership may feel it is necessary to stage a spectacular operation in order to throw the military off balance and to shore up their flagging prestige. 3.5(c)

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NOTES

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Reports of SA-7 Missiles in Argentina

3.3(b)(1)

Argentine terrorists have SA-7 missiles in their possession. the missiles, allegedly smuggled from Chile to Argentina, had been used to shoot down an Argentine aircraft. 3.3(b)(1)

there are between three and 30 SA-7s in the hands of Argentine terrorists, The SA-7 is a shoulder-launched heat-seeking missile designed for use by ground troops against tactical strike aircraft. 3.3(b)(1)

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there is no solid evidence that any Latin American terrorist group, including the Argentine terrorists, has SA-7 missiles.

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There have been no reports of recent shipments of Soviet or Eastern Bloc weapons to Argentine terrorists nor is there any indication that Argentine terrorists have received special training in the use of SA-7s, which is necessary if the missile is to be used effectively. Finally, although the terrorists have destroyed Argentine military aircraft in the past, there is no reported evidence that these aircraft were destroyed by missiles. 3.5(c)

Uruguayan Exiles Murdered in Argentina

Two former Uruguayan political leaders living in exile in Buenos Aires were abducted from their homes on 17 and 18 May. According to a police press release, their bullet-riddled bodies, and those of two other Uruguayans, were found in an abandoned automobile on 21 May. The police statement added that the car contained pamphlets in which a subversive group took credit for the killing. Although the group was not specifically named, the implication was that the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) was responsible. According to a Spanish news agency, the terrorists' communique said the "execution" was carried out at the request of the Uruguayan Tupamaros because the exiles had betrayed them.

According to The Washington Post, observers in Argentina believe the police version is a cover-up and suggested that hard-liners in the Argentine military have begun to cooperate with the military governments in neighboring Uruguay and Chile in getting rid of troublesome exiles. According to the U.S. embassy, one prominent Buenos Aires newspaper clearly implied that the police statement is a deception and that the abduction was carried out by elements of the Argentine government. The paper warned indirectly that such actions will damage Argentina's international image.

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